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) 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT EXIST 
CONCERNING WHETHER GRAND COUNTY IS ESTOPPED FROM 
ENFORCING ITS SUBDIVISION ORDINANCE. 
Grand County, in its Brief of Appellee, argues that Mr. 
Rogers "presented no genuine issues of material facts which would 
preclude summary judgment." See Brief of Appellee, p. 5. The 
record on appeal, as specifically set forth below, indicates 
otherwise. In the course of rendering its unpublished decision, 
the court of appeals not only failed to consider various genuine 
issues of material fact but it failed to view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to 
Mr. Rogers, who was the nonmoving party. 
The Grand County Recorder, in the instant case, accepted and 
recorded each document utilized to memorialize the sale and 
conveyance of properties by Mr. Rogers to various third parties 
(See R. 3 6-39, Affidavit of Lester Rogers, %9) .x Grand County 
acknowledges accepting and recording the previously mentioned 
documents (See R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ff2-4). By accepting and 
recording the various instruments, Grand County performed acts 
lSee R. 18-21. 
5 
that are inconsistent with its subsequent enforcement of the 
subdivision ordinance. 
In its Brief, Grand County asserts that the mere recordation 
of instruments by the County Recorder does not constitute estoppel 
or waiver. See Brief of Appellee, p. 6-7. The record, however, 
reveals that this is not a mere recordation case. Not only did 
the County Recorder accept and duly record each of the instruments 
but it reported and transmitted the conveyances to other County 
agencies, which is consistent with the Recorder's statutory duty 
to report changes in ownership where only a part of the property 
is conveyed and then transmit a legal description of the portion 
of the property retained. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1995). 
Presumably, the Grand County Recorder reported and transmitted the 
change-in-ownership and partial-conveyance information to other 
agencies when Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed the parcels of property 
to the various third-party property owners. 
In the course of addressing the recordation issue, the court 
of appeals, in its unpublished decision, concluded that "[t]he 
recording of the relevant instruments is for notice purposes and 
is unrelated to the County's enforcement of zoning ordinances . . 
. ." See Grand County v. Rogers, 2000 UT App 162, pp. 1-2. 
Nowhere in its decision did the court of appeals' discuss or 
analyze the aforementioned statutory duty of the County Recorder 
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to index deeds and other instruments "partitioning or affecting 
the title to or possession of real property" as well as the 
grantors and grantees of such as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 17-
21-6(1) (b) & (c) (1995) . Moreover, the court of appeals failed to 
consider that the County Recorder, as previously discussed, is 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 17-21-22 (1995) to report changes in 
ownership "where only a part of the grantor's property is 
currently conveyed" and then "transmit an additional form showing 
a full legal description of the portion retained." 
In addition to the acceptance and recording of instruments, 
each of the parties to whom Mr. Rogers sold and conveyed the 
subject properties possessed and made extensive valuable 
improvements to their individual parcels of property (See R. 36-
39, Affidavit of Lester Rogers, flO). In fact, each of the third 
parties obtained a building permit for their improvements, which 
means that an official from the County, in each instance, 
personally inspected either the actual parcel of property or the 
building plans of the respective individual third-party property 
owner prior to issuing each building permit. At oral argument 
before the court of appeals, Grand County essentially acknowledged 
that it issued building permits to the buyers of Mr. Rogers' 
property over the course of several years. Grand County does not 
refute this in its Brief before this Court. 
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The application of equitable estoppel to the instant case is 
particularly appropriate inasmuch as Grand County waited over five 
years after the sale of the first parcel of property by Mr. Rogers 
to Ms. Betty L. Relitz and almost a year and a half after the last 
sale to file a Complaint, alleging that Mr. Rogers had failed to 
properly subdivide the subject property prior to selling the same 
to third parties (See R. 1-4, Complaint). Moreover, application 
of estoppel is especially appropriate in the instant case inasmuch 
as this is not a case where the party claiming estoppel acted 
fraudulently, in bad faith, or with knowledge. See Utah County v. 
Young, 615 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1980); Xanthos v. Board of 
Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1038 (Utah 1984). 
In the* course of rendering its decision, the court of appeals 
also failed to view the facts and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to Mr. Rogers as the 
nonmoving party. See Trethway v. Miracle Mortgage, Inc., 2000 UT 
12, f2, 995 P.2d 599; Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 
233 (Utah 1993) ; see also Estate Landscape & Snow Removal 
Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 
322, 324 n.l (Utah 1992) (clarifying that reviewing court should 
view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party, not losing 
party). At the very least, a determination of whether estoppel 
applies to the facts of the instant case requires the fact finder 
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to consider testimony and therefore make credibility 
determinations about such testimony as it pertains to the elements 
of estoppel. See generally Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 
292, 294, 431 P.2d 126, 128 (1967); Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 
1291, 1292 (Utah 1978) (stating that even in cases where facts are 
not in "complete conflict" but the "understanding, intention, and 
consequences" of the facts are disputed, the matters "can only be 
resolved by a trial"). That there exist triable issues is further 
supported by Grand County's contention in its Brief that "general 
law provides that waivers of subdivision controls are not to be 
inferred unless the conduct said to constitute a waiver was 
clearly intended as such." See Brief of Appellee, p. 7. As 
recognized by this Court, the actions or events allegedly 
supporting waiver are "intensely fact dependent" and require the 
fact finder to assess "the totality of the circumstances" before 
making such a determination. Soter's v. Deseret Federal Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935, 940-41 (Utah 1993); accord Pledger v. 
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 1fl6, 982 P.2d 572. 
Nowhere in its unpublished decision did the court of appeals 
consider the disputed material facts that the subject parcels of 
property had been extensively improved or that Grand County had 
substantially delayed its enforcement of the subdivision 
ordinance. The court of appeals' legal conclusion that Grand 
9 
County was not estopped is in direct conflict with this Court's 
decision in Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980), where 
this Court stated that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies 
xxwhen a county committed an act or omission upon which the 
developer could rely in good faith in making substantial changes 
in position or incurring extensive expenses." Id. at 1267 (citing 
Pasco County v. Tampa Dev. Corp., 3 64 S.2d 850 (Fla. Ct . App. 
1978)). Further, the court of appeals failed to consider that the 
disputed material facts in the instant case constitute more than 
mere " [s] ilence or inaction." Young, 615 P. 2d at 1268. The 
material facts of the instant case, when properly considered, 
constitute the exceptional circumstances contemplated for the 
application of estoppel against Grand County. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER 
THE ABSENT PROPERTY OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT PARCELS 
OF PROPERTY TO BE NECESSARY PARTIES TO BE JOINED 
PRIOR TO A FULL AND FAIR DETERMINATION OF THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
Without any supporting citation, Grand County baldly asserts 
that the lot owners of the subject property are not indispensable 
parties.2 See Brief of Appellee, p. 8. For the reasons detailed 
2Grand County asserts that the absent third parties "cannot 
get building permits under current conditions . . . , and they 
cannot have the benefits of subdivision improvements, which may 
be required . . . ." See Brief of Appellee, p. 8. As previously 
discussed, the third-party property owners have already obtained 
building permits and have already made substantial and valuable 
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in the previously filed Brief of Petitioner as well as that below, 
the court of appeals misinterpreted Rule 19, of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and erroneously concluded that the third-party 
buyers are not necessary parties. 
The court of appeals failed to consider Mr. Rogers' arguments 
that according to Rule 19(a) (1), the property owners to whom Mr. 
Rogers sold various parcels of the subject property are necessary 
parties to the litigation because in their absence complete relief 
cannot be accorded among those already parties. Cf. Stone v. Salt 
Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 631, 637 (1960) (holding 
"grantees of deeds, the validity of which is under attack" to be 
necessary parties). From 1994 through 1997, Mr. Rogers sold and 
conveyed various parcels of the subject property to bona fide 
third parties (See R. 15-17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ff2-5; R. 36-39; 
Affidavit of Lester Rogers, ff8-10). In light of the claims 
asserted by Grand County and, more importantly, by virtue of the 
district court's judgment that requires Mr. Rogers to obtain 
subdivision approval for property that is owned by third-party 
owners, the interests of the third-party property owners, who are 
improvements to their individual parcels of property pursuant to 
building permits previously issued by Grand County (See R. 38, 
Affidavit of Lester Rogers, flO). That subdivision improvements 
may be required of the absent third-party owners supports joinder 
pursuant to Rule 19. 
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not parties to this action, are directly adverse to the interests 
asserted by Grand County (See R. 63-66, Judgment (Enjoining 
Violation of Subdivision Ordinance). In fact, the district 
court's judgment essentially voids the previous sales and 
conveyances by Mr. Rogers of the various parcels of the subject 
property to bona fide third parties (See id.) . The fact that the 
third-party property owners are necessary is further demonstrated 
by both Grand County's Complaint and its Motion for Summary 
Judgment in which it asserted that Mr. Rogers' sales and 
conveyances of the subject parcels of property are void (See R. 3, 
Complaint, %2 of the Prayer; R. 2 7-28, Amended Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
R. 41, Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment). 
In addition, the absent property owners are necessary parties 
under Rule 19(a) (2) inasmuch as they have an interest relating to 
the subject property and are so situated that the disposition of 
the action in their absence may impair or impede their ability to 
protect that interest.3 See Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2); see also 
Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Comm. v. Thompson Michie 
3Grand County admitted that the absent third-party property 
owners have an interest in the subject real property (See R. 15-
17, Affidavit of Mary Hofhine in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Hf2-5; see also R. 3 6-3 9, Affidavit of 
Lester Rogers, f|8-10) . 
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Assocs., Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Utah 1986) ("A plaintiff may 
not obtain relief adverse to the property rights of others who are 
not adverse parties to the case without bringing them before the 
court."). The district court's judgment is a judgment lien upon 
the subject real property, and thus encumbers the interests of the 
absent third-party property owners for purposes of enforcing the 
various subdivision ordinance requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-22-1 (Supp. 1999) . Enforcement of the subdivision 
requirements, by virtue of the judgment, are presumably 
enforceable also upon the third-party property owners without any 
response or opposition by them to the enforcement. 
The court of appeals all but failed to consider that the 
district court's present disposition may subject Mr. Rogers to a 
substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 
inconsistent obligations in order to comply with the district 
court's ruling as it is presently fashioned. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
19(a) (2). Even if Mr. Rogers could legally comply with the 
district court's order, such compliance would subject Mr. Rogers 
to multiple obligations that would likely be incurred by actions 
filed by the absent third-party property owners against Mr. Rogers 
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to defend their interests or otherwise shift responsibility for 
assessments incurred by the subdivision ordinance requirements.4 
With little or no consideration of the joinder issue, the 
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment in which the 
district court ordered Mr. Rogers to apply and obtain subdivision 
approval for the parcels of property already sold to third parties 
not before the court (See R. 64, Judgment (Enjoining Violation of 
Subdivision Ordinance)). The district court ordered Mr. Rogers' 
compliance notwithstanding that he does not have the legal 
capacity or right to bring the previously sold and conveyed 
parcels of property into compliance with the applicable zoning and 
subdivision ordinances because ownership of the parcels, whether 
deemed legal or equitable, now lies with absent third parties. 
Not only did the court of appeals fail to consider the two 
general factors in Utah R. Civ. P. 19(a),5 it also ignored this 
Court's decision in Bonneville Tower, holding that the "failure to 
bring all parties before the court prevents it from properly 
reaching the merits of plaintiff's claim." Bonneville Tower, 728 
P.2d at 1020. Finally, the court of appeals' decision conflicts 
4Grand County acknowledges in its Brief that the absent 
third-party property owners "may have claims against Mr. Rogers . 
. . ." See Brief of Appellee, p. 9. 
5See Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 
1990). 
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with Stone v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 2d 196, 356 P.2d 631 (I960), 
where this Court held that "grantees of deeds, the validity of 
which is under attack", are necessary parties. Stone, 356 P.2d at 
637. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISINTERPRETED THE OCCUPYING 
CLAIMANTS ACT AND FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT OR ISSUES OF LAW 
EXIST IN LIGHT OF THE ACT. 
Without any analysis or authority, Grand County argues that 
the court of appeals correctly held that the Occupying Claimants 
Act does not apply to the instant case. See Brief of Appellee, p. 
9. For the reasons detailed below, the court of appeals 
misinterpreted the Occupying Claimants Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-
1, et seq. (1994 & Supp. 2000), in the course of concluding that 
the Act does not apply in this case. 
In the course of interpreting a statute, this Court's 
"primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Evans v. 
State, 963 P.2d 177, 184 (Utah 1998). The best evidence of the 
legislature's true intent and purpose in enacting a statute is the 
plain language of the statute. See State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 
312 (Utah 1995). 
Section 57-6-1 of the Act provides: 
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Where an occupant of real estate has color 
of title to the real estate, and in good 
faith has made valuable improvements on the 
real estate, and is afterwards in a proper 
action found not to be the owner, no 
execution shall issue to put the owner in 
possession of the real estate after the 
filing of a complaint as hereinafter 
provided, until the provisions of this 
chapter have been complied with. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1 (Supp. 2000) . Further, section 57-6-
4(2) (a) provides that 
Any person has color of title who has 
occupied a tract of real estate by himself 
[or herself] , or by those under whom he [or 
she] claims, for the term of five years, or 
who has occupied it for less time, if he [of 
she], or those under whom he [of she] claims, 
have at any time during the occupancy with 
the knowledge or consent, express or implied, 
of the real owner made any valuable 
improvements on the real estate, or if he [or 
she] or those under whom he [or she] claims 
have at any time during the occupancy paid 
the ordinary county taxes on the real estate 
for any one year, and two years have elapsed 
without a repayment by the owner, and the 
occupancy is continued up to the time at 
which the action is brought by which the 
recovery of the real estate is obtained. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4(2) (a) (Supp. 2000) (Bracketed material 
added). The record demonstrates that the absent third-party 
property owners to whom Mr. Rogers sold the subject parcels of 
property have occupied the subject real property and have made 
valuable improvements to their respective parcels (See R. 36-39, 
Affidavit of Lester Rogers, Ul6, 8, and 10) . At oral argument 
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before the court of appeals, Grand County acknowledged the 
improvements to the subject property in the course of discussing 
building permits that had been issued to the property owners. 
Contrary to the plain language of the statute, the court of 
appeals held that the Occupying Claimants Act does not apply to 
the instant case. See Grand County v. Rogers, 2000 UT App 162, 
pp. 2-3. In the course of interpreting the Act, the court of 
appeals stated, "The remedy sought by the County seeks neither to 
expel them nor to encumber their property in any way." See id. 
Contrary to the court of appeals' conclusion, the district 
court's judgment, at the very least, constructively voids the 
previous sales and conveyances by Mr. Rogers of the various 
parcels of the subject property to bona fide third parties. This 
is consistent with both Grand County's Complaint and its Motion 
for Summary Judgment in which it asserted that Mr. Rogers' sales 
and conveyances of the subject parcels of property are void (See 
R. 3, Complaint, f2 of the Prayer; R. 2 7-28, Amended Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
R. 41, Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment). Moreover, the district court's judgment acts 
as a judgment lien upon the subject real property, and thus 
encumbers the interests of all the absent third-party property 
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owners for purposes of enforcing the various subdivision ordinance 
requirements. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1 (Supp. 1999) . 
In the course of its interpretation, the court of appeals 
failed to consider both the plain language of the Act and the 
genuine issues of disputed material facts under which the absent 
third-party property owners and Mr. Rogers occupy the subject 
property and thereby have color of title as against Grand County. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-4 (Supp. 2000). Finally, in light of 
the interests of the occupying claimants in this case, material 
issues exist concerning the remedies that the property owners are 
entitled to in light of the competing interests asserted by Grand 
County in this action and whether the zoning and subdivision 
ordinances of the County take precedence over the interests 
provided for in Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-1, et seg. (1994 & Supp. 
2000). See Utah Code Ann. § 57-6-3 (1994) (providing remedy for 
parties to hold property as tenants in common). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that previously submitted 
in the Brief of Petitioner, Mr. Rogers respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse the court of appeals' unpublished decision in which 
it affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Grand County and remand the case for trial on the 
18 
existing genuine issues of disputed material fact and issues of 
law and for any other relief the Court deems appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7th day of May, 2001. 
WIGGINS, P .C . 
y^~J 
Wihgms 
Attorn^ys^tor Pe t i t i one r / 
AppeTTmit 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
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